Although all nine schools served urban, minority, and low-income communities and all nine boasted high levels of academic achievement in reading and mathematics, there were important variations among the schools. They varied in their student enrollments, grade spans, ethnic composition, rate of improvement, and the extent to which they used school reform models. They also varied in their relationship with their district offices and in the extent to which they experienced turnover in teaching staff through the process of reform.
The schools had enrollments that ranged from 283 students (at Baldwin Elementary) to 1,171 students (at Goodale Elementary). Six of the schools (Baldwin, Baskin, Burgess, Hawley, Peck, and Ward) had less than 500 students. Three of the schools (Centerville, Goodale, and Spellman) had more than 500 students. Although most of the schools had the advantage of a small enrollment (in contrast with the stereotype of large urban schools), there were large schools that achieved impressive academic results. Though school size may have been an important factor in some of these schools, it probably should also be noted that some of the smaller schools were just as small when they were considered low-performing schools by their districts or states.
Regardless of enrollment, all of the schools managed to create an atmosphere of smallness. Principals, teachers, parents, and students knew each other, cared about each other, and worked together well. Even in the largest schools, there was generally a warm, personal atmosphere enjoyed by all members of the school community.
Four of the schools (Baldwin, Baskin, Burgess, and Goodale) had kindergarten through grade five. Hawley and Peck were similar; however, they also had pre-kindergarten programs. Centerville and Spellman served students in kindergarten through grade six, while Ward served students from pre-kindergarten through grade eight.
In six of the nine schools (Burgess, Centerville, Goodale, Hawley, Peck, and Spellman), a majority of the students were African American. However, the size of the majority ranged from 100 percent of the students at Goodale in Detroit to only 56 percent of the students at Hawley in Milwaukee. At Baskin a majority of the students (75 percent) were Hispanic. At Baldwin, a majority of the students (72 percent) were Asian American. Although 47 percent of the students at Ward were Asian American, there was not any racial or ethnic group that comprised a majority of the student population.
In seven of the nine schools, at least 80 percent of the students were designated as low-income through the federal free or reduced-price lunch program. At Hawley, 71 percent of the students and at Spellman 63 percent of the students participated in the free or reduced-price lunch program. These demographics are shown in Table 3, below.
Table 3: Student Demographics
| School | City |
% African American |
% Asian American |
% Hisp. |
% White |
% Low- Income |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Baldwin |
Boston |
17 |
72 |
4 |
7 |
80 |
|
Baskin |
San Antonio |
6 |
1 |
75 |
18 |
92 |
|
Burgess |
Atlanta |
99 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
81 |
|
Centerville |
East St. Louis |
89 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
86 |
|
Goodale |
Detroit |
100 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
87 |
|
Hawley |
Milwaukee |
56 |
2 |
12 |
27 |
71 |
|
Peck |
Houston |
79 |
0 |
18 |
2 |
94 |
|
Spellman |
Cheverly |
73 |
1 |
17 |
9 |
63 |
|
Ward |
Chicago |
18 |
47 |
16 |
19 |
88 |
Several of the schools had significant populations of students who were learning English as a second language. In particular, at Baldwin, Ward, and Spellman more than one-fourth of the students were learning English as a second language.
The researchers tried to discover which schools experienced substantial student mobility. Baldwin did not report mobility data. The other schools reported mobility rates ranging from 15 percent at Hawley to 49 percent at Baskin. Schools were not always able to explain how their mobility rates were calculated so there may be differences in the meaning of the rates. In general, these mobility rates are low in contrast to the mobility rates of some urban, high-poverty schools. Perhaps, the low mobility rates were low, at least in part, because parents did not want to move away from schools where their children were achieving important academic gains.
All nine of the schools had engaged in comprehensive efforts to improve academic achievement for all of their students. However, only two of the schools used popular models for comprehensive school reform. Centerville Elementary used the Accelerated Schools Program, developed by Henry Levin at Stanford University. Peck Elementary used the Success for All Program, developed by Robert Slavin at John Hopkins University. In both cases the reform model played a role in the schools? improvement efforts; however, each was only part of the overall story of reform in the school. In each of the schools, there was considerable evidence of the nine components of comprehensive school reform, as described in the federal 1998 Comprehensive School Reform Demonstration Program. For instance, many of the schools sought to use research-based practices, provide intensive professional development, ensure the buy-in and support of teachers and other school staff, and secure the backing of the district administration.
In schools like Baskin and Peck, rapid improvement in academic achievement was shown by sharp rises in student test scores during a three- or four-year period. In contrast, at schools such as Goodale and Centerville, teachers and administrators believed they had been engaged in steady improvement efforts over the past decade. Respondents had varying notions about when the most important changes began. At Burgess, Goodale, Hawley, and Peck most of the respondents connected the beginning of change efforts with the arrival of the current principal. At Centerville, Spellman, and Ward the previous principal was given substantial credit for initiating the reform efforts. At Baldwin respondents perceived the presence of a new principal, as well as a new foundation supported reform initiative, and a new superintendent as converging factors that initiated dramatic improvements in teaching and learning. Similarly, at Baskin changes were attributed to both new campus and district leadership, as well as to the power of a state accountability system.
In some cases, student achievement data did not reflect the timeline of reform efforts suggested by informants. For example, even though Goodale teachers and parents reported that their reform efforts had been ongoing for several years under the leadership of their principal, they also admitted that the fruits of their efforts were not shown in achievement score gains until the last two years.
If the selection criteria used for this study had been applied, none of the nine schools would have been considered high-performing schools five years ago. In fact, in most of the schools, the evidence of academic achievement was dismal before 1994. In most of the schools (specifically, Baldwin, Baskin, Burgess, Peck, and Spellman) educators and parents tended to believe that reform efforts began after 1994. However, the staff and parents at the other schools tended to believe that important improvement efforts were in progress prior to 1994, even though they may not have resulted in improved test scores until after 1994.
Leadership and guidance from the district office played a substantial role in the improvement at Baldwin, Baskin, and Peck. In contrast, the district office played a more modest role in the improvement at Goodale and Hawley. One might note that the schools that made the most rapid gains were the schools with the greatest district involvement.
In the schools in which district involvement was greatest, the district established clear expectations for improvement, delineated a path for improvement, and provided support and technical assistance along the way. For instance, the Houston Independent School District made clear that the new principal at Peck Elementary was expected to substantially improve academic achievement as measured by the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills, the Texas School Accountability System, and the Houston Independent School District School Accountability System. The principal was given the opportunity to adopt the area district?s Project GRAD program and eagerly consented to participate. Project GRAD included the Success for All Program, the Move-It Math Program, a plan for improving consistency in classroom management and discipline, and the Communities in Schools Program, which incorporated dropout prevention and social service agency components. Staff from the area district office provided support along the way, particularly as the school encountered rough beginnings on the path to improvement. Similar direction, guidance, and support were made available to Baldwin Elementary by the Boston Public Schools and to Baskin Elementary by the San Antonio Independent School District.
Even in the places where district involvement was less extensive, the schools were able to access important services from the district. For instance, the Goodale faculty was one of the best consumers of professional development offerings from the district office. Similarly, Hawley could not have been a successful city-wide school without the provision of extensive transportation services from the district office.
At some of the schools such as Ward and Peck, academic improvements have come with few changes in teaching staff. In contrast, at Burgess, only five teachers remained in 1998-99 from the staff the principal, Carter, inherited in 1993-94. At Spellman, one teacher described the early years of their reform effort by saying, "We would have to look up daily to see how much the staff had changed."
None of the schools reported that many teachers had been fired. However, in several of the schools, it was clear that teachers who did not accept the school?s goals and vision were encouraged to leave. In some cases, principals began processes of documenting unacceptable behavior. In some cases, principals bluntly invited teachers to seek jobs elsewhere. There were some situations where principals made clear what was expected, invited people to take part, and if staff members chose not to participate, the principal offered to help them find other employment. Still in other cases, teachers began feeling uncomfortable and chose to leave when so many of their peers were trying new approaches and expressing commitment to the school?s new vision.
Two factors were important in reducing teacher turnover or in creating situations where turnover was minimal. First, principals tended to be highly selective in hiring new teachers. For instance, at Goodale, candidates were hired only if they demonstrated a passion for excellence and a love for children. The principal would leave a position vacant instead of filling it with a person who would not fit into the school?s culture of continuous improvement and concern for children. Second, principals organized fiscal and human resources in a manner that provided substantial support for teachers. Teachers felt supported and perceived that they had a good chance of being successful in their roles. At some of the schools, e.g., Burgess and Spellman, such support was less apparent at the beginning of the reform but has increased substantially in recent years.
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[Background] |
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[Improvement Strategies] |