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In Levine's studies of actual, as opposed to anticipated, disagreements, he assigned college students to three-person groups that were divided two-to-one over a controversial social issue such as the death penalty, the insanity defense, or prayer in the schools. Group members discussed the issue and then recorded their opinions and the number of arguments they could remember from the discussion. In some groups, the minority member succeeded in changing the opinion of at least one majority member; in others the majority changed the minority member's position; and in some all members maintained their original views on the topic. Levine was particularly interested in the dynamics of the groups in which cognitive changes took place, and in the nature of those changes. As he explains, "they have relevance to teaching and learning. It is of interest, from an instructional perspective, to learn whether students reason differently, and whether they are better arguers, under some circumstances than under others."
Analyses of data taken from the small-group studies showed systematic differences between groups depending on whether the minority or the majority influence was stronger. For example, minority members who either succeeded in changing at least one majority member's opinion or at minimum refused to change their own view were the most talkative and active members of their groups. "They made many assertions about facts," says Levine. "They didn't ask many questions. They were very self-confident." The opposite was true of minority members who, says Levine, "caved in" to the majority and changed their minds. These minority members talked less, were less assertive, and showed less confidence.
Other cognitive differences showed up in the participants' ability to remember the arguments of other group members. Majority members recalled minority arguments when those arguments held firm against their own or succeeded in changing their own; that is, when the minority arguments were actively and assertively expressed. Majority members failed to remember minority arguments when the minority member changed his opinion; that is, when the minority arguments were weakly expressed. On the other hand, minority members did not remember majority arguments that convinced them to change their opinions.
According to Levine, such patterns of recall and assertiveness suggest that simply assigning students to classroom discussion groups may not be as productive as trying to design those groups for certain outcomes. "Discussion groups can end up operating in different ways," Levine says. "And those different ways can have important differences for students learning to think. Clearly, a strong, consistent minority can have an impact on what happens with the majority. But when a minority member is persuaded to change his mind, it seems not to be because the majority is so strong or assertive--more likely it is because he has felt intimidated."
In the studies involving anticipated conflict, Levine wanted to know how the prospect of participating in a group argument would affect cognitive activity. "How hard will you work if you think you are going to be in a group of six in which everyone else disagrees with you? What about a group that's divided three to three? Four to two? Do your opinions change? Do you look for arguments to bolster them? Do you research the opposition's arguments?" Researchers asked the college students who took part in this study how much pressure they thought the group would put on them and how likely they thought it was that the other group members would adopt their position. Responses indicated that minority members expected group pressure to correspond inversely to the size of the minority. In other words, a lone minority member expected more pressure than someone who shared the minority view with one or two other members. Similarly, minority members were less likely to expect the group to adopt their view, especially if they were the single proponent of that view.
Levine was particularly interested to see how people's expectations of their role in the group would affect their preparation for the discussion. Would they read only arguments that supported their own position, or would they examine arguments they thought they might meet in their opponents? How long would they spend reading the background materials available to them? The outcomes of the study were systematic in that minority members spent more time reading than majority members, and those who were in one-person minorities looked only for material that supported their position. Those in two-person minorities were more even-handed, reading up on both their own and the opposition's views. Majority members who anticipated strong (two-person) minorities also read only what would bolster their own views, becoming even-handed only if they expected to confront just one minority member. Thus, Levine concludes that when people expect to have to present and defend a position on an issue, their information gathering corresponds to the amount of challenge or pressure they believe they will encounter. The stronger the opposition they anticipate, the more time they will spend on research and the more likely that their research will be biased.
"What this study suggests for instruction," Levine says, "is that the mere anticipation of having to argue a position publicly is strong motivation for activities that foster learning and thinking." Together, the strands of Levine's work indicate that both anticipated and actual discussions about contradictory opinions might prove to be useful instructional techniques in classrooms.
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[Thinking Through Experimentation ]